The "Gift" Biden has given Putin, and the Yoke he has placed upon Ukrainian shoulders, military and civilian...
My takes on the "offensive," the sallies into Russia (ground and drones) and the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam across the Dnipro River.
Drone image of Bakhmut taken on Friday, May 19th, 2023; by Tyler Hicks for the NYTimes.
Dear Citizens and Elected Officials:
Editor’s Update, Thursday, July 6th, 2023: I thought this YouTube segment, 18:00 with retired American European Commander Ben Hodges was crystal clear on where we are, praising Ukraine’s military high command for proceeding to save lives and test the Russian lines before committing the bulk of the newly trained brigades to exploit any openings, and politely, but without hesitation criticizing the Biden Adm. for not supplying the weapons - ATACMS long range missiles (300 km, 180 miles) and modern aircraft - Ukraine needs to win, especially to evict Russia from Crimea. Why is the US hesitating…which is the subtext when you go to the actual video? First, the nuclear fear to which Hodges says there is “zero positive outcome for Putin/Russia if they use nuclear weapons. Zero.” Second consideration, which Hodges is upfront about it being conjecture, is that China has conveyed its opposition to any course of action which will push Russia into being a failed state…which defeat on the battlefieds of Ukraine might do, especially in light of the conflict with Prigozhin and the strongly implied unhappiness of others high in the Russian chain of military command.
Hodges is also critical that we failed to deter Russia all along events from Obama/Syria red line to Georgia invasion and then Ukraine 2014 - which is exactly how I’ve been reading Putin’s assessments since before the invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022.
Editor’s Update, Sunday, June 25th, 2023: When I was an undergraduate at Lafayette College in my freshman year, there was a “dollar per year man” teaching in the government department, classes being held in the elegant Kirby Hall of Civil Rights, the most expensive college building of its kind when built in the prophetic year of 1929, the inscribed motto over the entrance being the business titan’s prefered form of Bibilical justification: “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own.” (That always bothered me).
This professor’s name was Benjamin May, and I didn’t enjoy his course or the textbook, a rambling one about political science, which couldn’t hold a candle to the one I now read, almost daily scripture like - how’s that for “secularization” (except it probes and dissects rather than dictates a point of view), my third time through its 810 pages: “A History of Western Political Thought” by J. S. McClelland (1996).
The most animated portion of Professor May’s lectures amidst the oak seating and wood paneling of the hall, was when he described the guessing game over the outcome of power struggles inside the Kremlin leadership. Speeches and especially pictures of the leadership on ceremonial occasions - as atop the balcony overlooking Red Square on key Bolshevik anniverseries - were put under a microscope to look for clues of cropping, dubbing and of course, missing leaders entirely. There may never have been a press release or annoucement of changes triggered by events or infighting - or worse. Well, we’re quite some time away from 1968-69 and Red regimes in Russia, but not from dictatorship and the supporting - or is it competing - oligarchy, seemingly combining two of the three major Western forms of politics which have been with us in Western political thought since Plato and Aristole: rule by one, the few or many - or monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, each capable of degenerating into tyranny, oligarchy or demagogy.
From the “good old days” when Dictators wouldn’t tolerate an oligarch with a private army. From the Toronto Star newspaper archives: Nov. 10, 1945. Actually, some of the “heads” here look like they were “cut and pasted.”
Which brings us to the events in Russia over the past 48 hours, and the deceptive (I feel) calm that has settled over a coup attempt by one of the leading oligarchs - against just who is not clear: against Putin the tyrant, or only the senior military leaders who have allowed one oligarch from civilian life, dare I say civil and economic life, to essentially raise a private army and create therefore a challenge to both the civilian top leader, Putin, and his chosen military leaders. All in a deepening war which has not gone well.
And in his adroit rendering’s of key portion’s of Plato’s world view, good professor McClelland says this, relevant for the matters at hand, in Russia, and perhaps, sadly, the US as well: “Unlike oligarchy, which disappears overnight as a result of its unfitness for war, democracy goes through a series of well-defined phases before it finally sinks into the mire of demagogic tyranny.” (Say, isn’t that based in Florida now?).
Well, let’s get out of the books and into to the events. Here’s where I am early Sunday evening. The past 48 hours have humbled almost all the Russia watchers, as a hybrid civilian-military oligarch, “comparatively” successful in war, looked like he was losing control of his army by the threat of them having to sign a loyalty oath to Putin’s military by early July, and that thrown gauntlet was a major factor sending him and some of his 25,000 troops rolling on the long road to Moscow Saturday, after capturing the military “Southern Command” center of Rostov-on-Don without any shots being fired. That, along with the fact that no massive Russian air sortie went after him, nor major elements of Putin’s own “Praetorian Guard” of some say, 250,000 troops, the National Guard available in the Moscow region to head off coup attempts like this one. (With what hardware relative to Wagner’s I don’t know). I read in the NY Times of two skirmishes along the 450 miles the Wagner covered on the long M-4 highway, a few planes and helicopters and little details of a ground attempt to stop them, but the video and photographic evidence is scarce, suggesting along with the dump trucks, tractor trailers and Jersey barricades pushed aside by Wagner’s armor - suggesting to me that the Russian military largely sat this one out. It is not clear what that military of nearly 1 million would have done had Putin’s Guards clashed directly with Wagner, since the best military units are presumably all deployed along the long 900 war front with Ukraine. Was this neutrality then - or an indication that Prigozhin had substantial allies if not the full committment from the Russian military?
The reading public is forgiven if confused by Mr. Prigozhin’s rhetoric strongly indicating the war was a flawed moral cause from the start, and a botched military campaign since then as well. And if Putin had followed with actions to match his early morning denunciations of Wagner’s “drive” to Moscow, treason vs their “march for justice” there would have been massive air strikes to settle the matter. Perhaps then each of the major protagonists got cold feet in assessing their chances and weighing the strength of their allies, uncertainty leading to an uneasy “compromise” and exile in Belarus for Mr. Prigozhin - and how many bodyguards did he take, for quite of few commentators added that “his days are numbered.”
And the impact on the war in Ukraine? The bright dawn of hope on Saturday for Ukraine - that Russia would dissolve into civil war, the fears of Mr. Putin of a repeat of 1917-1921 being his main nightmare analogy, publicly broached - seemed very clouded by late Saturday evening. My own sense is we will not know for perhaps weeks who will “retire,” take a “medical leave” or disappear entirely from the power struggles between military and civilian oligarchs and the damaged hull of the allegedly tight ship of state Putin has been projecting for decades now.
At first glance, these events cannot have helped the moral of Russian troops manning those 9 mile deep triple lines of defensive fortifications facing the Ukrainian offensive. Yet Russian is far from a more complete mobilization of manpower if not of resources, domestic or from abroad, and it is conceivable, but not likely that the events rally the nation to ever greater attempts to erase Ukraine as a nation - and as a Western leaning culture of its own.
And I do think that my support for a deepened and broadened Senate Resolution, little talked about in the US last week - from Senators Blumenthal and Graham - warning of NATO’s wrath - if not direct intervention - should Russia thrust a nuclear (and we must include chemical and dam busting war crimes alongside the nuclear) “incident” into the civilian and battlefield picture.
I’ll close with a note I heard, which I hope my readers will recognize as my independent note/observation from even before the Russian invasion: that when Putin is confronted not with words and distant NATO boundaries to be crossed - but with the deployment of real military power - he does back down to a more realistic form of great power statecraft. That note was sounded by Anne Applebaum on today’s version of Fareed Zacaria’s GPS show on CNN. It’s there clearly in my editing of the Senate Resolution, and in the opening lines I quoted from this posting on June 11th. Ukraine needs better offensive weapons to push Russia out, and NATO must be clear - “we’re coming in directly” - if Russia carries out any of the three categories of threatened war crimes in an attempt to solve their military problems and turn Ukraine into a modern day Carthage levelled to the ground.
Editor’s Update, June 24th, 2023: Welcome to my new readers. In light of the unprecedented events of the last 48 hours with the revolt of the Wagner group under Yvegeny V. Prigozhin, and the movement of some of his mechanized forces north some 400 miles on highway M-4, the “road to Moscow,” after capturing Rostov-on-Don overnight, an important military hub, the situation is too fluid to offer my readers anything with certainty beyond this: it will be a struggle of Prigozhin to win over substantial numbers of the Russian military to his side of the coup, and the layers of security forces as well. Whether there are effective well armed Russian units of any type loyal to Putin to put the Wagner thrust down is unknown. Presumably the best units are near the frontline in Ukraine. I’ll post subsequent updates in the Comments section at the end of this earlier June 11th mainline post. Of course these events would seem to be a major aide to Ukraine; let’s see how the Russian troops manning those three rings of defensive lines 9 miles thick in some places, react. Remember however, that Prigozhin is a ruthless hawk, and should he triumph it’s hard to imagine he pulls out of Ukraine and hands back its land to its 1991 borders. His very recent rhetoric might seem to suggest that - “the war has been a terrible mistake” - but I wouldn’t bet on a sudden withdrawal. And I think the odds are against him in succeeding, but so far he has moved faster and with more purpose than many analysts thought possible. And despite staging a clear false flag attack to claim Putin struck his forces first via missile and air attack. No bodies, no blood and no major equipment damaged were visible in his videos. One commentator said better hire “Spielberg.”
Introduction:
In the realm of the emerging new IT battlefield of deception and surveillance, surveillance by all the old traditional means goes on (informers, spies, divided loyalties) but now it’s aided by satellites, advanced over-the-horizon-radar (and more exotic detecting and jamming electronic means) and drones everywhere. It is getting harder and harder to conceal massed formations of infantry, armor, aircraft and supply convoys.
For example: the Russian massing of troops and tanks months before the invasion day of Feb. 24, 2022 was broadcast for all to see, by US intelligence, thus giving, if we had had the nerve, plenty of time to send Western troops inside Ukraine to head it off, even if that deployment might have been seen as a bit of a bluff in terms of actual numbers. However, that might have upset Mr. Putin, and we mustn’t do that. Much more than Biden has taken the measure of Putin, Putin has climbed inside Biden’s cautious head and knows the Kremlin retains the initiative and has control of the nuclear panic button. And going a bit further, what a gift President Biden has given the Kremlin’s military, and what a yoke he has placed upon Ukraine’s shoulders - military and civilian - by allowing this: Russia can hit Ukraine day and night, front lines, supply lines, cities and hospitals, schools, water and electric supply facilities anywhere in the country, but Ukraine can only hit back at the military targets inside their own territory captured by the Russians. This allows Russia a tremendous advantage as to where they can place troops, reinforcements, crucial supplies - out of reach of the furthest artillery and rocketry so far supplied by the “Allies,” and with the Ukrainian’s aging Air Force unable to reach the Russian bases far behind the front lines. It’s nearly crippling: thus the complete passitivity as Russia has used the past 5-6 months to build impressive looking defensive lines and fortifications - with no interference that I’m aware of.
Now, in a very minimalist fashion, Ukraine has attempted to level the steeply tilted playing field, and the range of limited methods were assassinations, commando raids and sabotage missions to try to make up for being forced to fight with one hand or more tied behind its back. The vast imbalance has got to end.
Despite not posting recently on the war against Ukraine, I have been following events there carefully, weighing and contrasting multiple sources, since so much of what has happened over the past few months falls within heavily disputed “propaganda territory.” Such as the long struggle over the city of Bakhmut, the apparent drone attacks on Moscow and the ground incursions into southern Russia by special “nationalist” units (or yes, worse) of the Ukranian army. And now the conflicting views over which side blew up - or deliberately undermined - the Kakhovka Dam across the Dnipro River in south central Ukraine. (Editor’s Note July 3rd: pretty much settled in my mind by the fact that Russia controlled the dam, and had a direct incentive to time its destruction to the beginning of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, and wreck havoc upon the lands and people of Ukraine all with one move. )
Let me set these aspects aside for a moment while I get right to what I see as the heart of the matter: what are the chances for success of the long-awaited Ukrainian military offensive to recapture the territory Russia has seized since 2014, which most certainly includes Crimea. Russia has been very active since the late fall of 2022 in building what many sources have called the most extensive series of trenches-fortifications since the titanic clashes on the Eastern Front in World War II. Or maybe the Atlantic Wall thrown up by the German military to prevent the second front opening up in France. And again, with no Ukrainian interference that I have heard of.
One excellent article in a major Spanish daily newspaper, El Pais, from April, points out the bunkers and “dragon’s” teeth are not as well anchored as the WWII type defenses; maybe so, but the triple lines of obstacles run for 75 miles in the vicinity of Zaporizhzhya, aiming to block an Ukrainian advance southeast towards Melitopal and to the infamous captured (and fully destroyed) city of Mariupol. That would be on the way to the coast of the Sea of Azov, the ultimate objective being to cut off a major land bridge to Crimea, which military and economic analysts see as crucial to Ukraine’s future as well as pushing the Russians out. And maybe the Ukrainians will find a way around these multiple defensive systems in the way the German army found a way around the Maginot Line in 1940, moving through areas the French thought would cost them too much time.
Editor’s Note: At several points below, I mention the 10:1 ratio of shells per day that Russian artillery rained down over Ukraine’s troops in the long seige of Bakhmut. If the Russians can match even half of that ratio overlooking the trench system they have built to block the “race to the sea,” what can Ukraine do about that - without air superiority? Which the West has denied them.
Graphic by Nacho Catalon in the April 17, 2023 article in El Pais: “Russia constructs 800 km of defensive lines to head off Ukrainian counter-offensive.” The lines should be read from the 1st line, an anti-tank ditch, lower left to upper right, the lines being separated by actual miles. Those are sniper shields and bunkers on the last hilly ground overlooking the system, top right.
Update: June 23, 2023: The new Senate Resolution, not tough enough (Blumenthal and Graham).
Dear Senators and Representatives:
While doing my research on the war in Ukraine, I came across this YouTube segment of the London Times Radio broadcast:
It features the views of a retired British army officer, in the chemical and tank warfare departments, with 23 years of service including ten on the battlefields of the Middle East facing Russia and Syria. This, and no American source, was where I learned about the now four page Senate Resolution drafted by Senators Graham and Blumenthal.
To the point of the comments of this officer, Sir Richard Barons, dated today, the 23rd of June, he calls attention to the Russian escalation of first blowing the dam at Kakhovka, over the Dnipro River, in early June, the ongoing threats to sabotage the huge nuclear facility at Zaporizhzhya, with another just over the border from Ukraine in Belarus, and a new one on me, a large chemical factory in northwest Crimea.
The resolution ignores the chemical threat, and only offers NATO action if the winds blow the radiation over NATO countries. Putin's actions have gone far enough. The destruction of the dam is a war crime with international pollution and agricultural implications, and the loosing of chemical and nuclear radiation will be as well - it may take weeks to blow with winds into NATO's territory. Enough is enough: toughen the resolution and make it clear that the full range of NATO options will be available to come to the aid of Ukraine should Russia commit any of these or comparable war crimes.
Here's the way I put the Putin-Biden dynamics in my latest posting:
Much more than Biden has taken the measure of Putin, Putin has climbed inside Biden’s cautious head and knows the Kremlin retains the initiative and has control of the nuclear panic button. And going a bit further, what a gift President Biden has given the Kremlin’s military, and what a yoke he has placed upon Ukraine’s shoulders - military and civilian - by allowing this: Russia can hit Ukraine day and night, front lines, supply lines, cities and hospitals, schools, water and electric supply facilities anywhere in the country, but Ukraine can only hit back at the military targets inside their own territory captured by the Russians. This allows Russia a tremendous advantage as to where they can place troops, reinforcements, crucial supplies - out of reach of the furthest artillery and rocketry so far supplied by the “Allies,” and with the Ukrainian’s aging Air Force unable to reach the Russian bases far behind the front lines. It’s nearly crippling: thus the complete passitivity as Russia has used the past 5-6 months to build impressive looking defensive lines and fortifications - with no interference that I’m aware of.
Here's the full posting from June 11th: https://williamrneil.substack.com/p/the-gift-biden-has-given-putin-and
Thank you for your time and attention in this very important matter of facing down, and defeating the greatest threat to peace in Europe since the events of 1936-1938.
Sincerely,
William R. Neil
Frostburg, MD
PS The draft of the Resolution is here: https://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/c6b346b8-036d-48ca-9a85-ed46f37e978b/nato-article-v-response.pdf
Here is what I wrote as a comment in the New York Times about this article, from June 10: “With Probes of Russian lines, Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Takes Shape,” by Andrew E. Kramer.
William Neil
MarylandJune 10
I think it is far, far too early to draw any firm conclusions. It may take many weeks or several months to get a clear picture of who is winning. My great worry on behalf of Ukraine, whom I am rooting for, but not blindly, is that the reluctance of the West, especially Biden and the Germans to supply the weapons that Ukraine has most repeatedly said it needed, will be decisive. This article blurs some of that, you can write "hundreds of tanks and APC's" but the truth is fewer than 200 modern tanks of all makes (three at least: American, German, British), no longer range rockets except a few attached to planes from Britain, and far too little mobile heavy artillery, with the Times reporting just a couple of weeks ago after Bakhmut fell that the Russians were outshelling the Ukrainian artillery 10:1 which is a very serious imbalance. And no modern planes which will arrive in time. If Biden really wants Ukraine to win - push the Russians all the way out - then all these missing components should have been there plus training before the offensive began. I hope I'm wrong and that Ukrainian morale and anger over the Russian destruction of their homeland provides the edge...but at this point we don't know anything more than that Biden's caution jeopardizes all that has been done so far. As in so many of Biden's efforts: too little, too late.
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9 REPLIES
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Padfoot
PortlandJune 10
@William Neil You gave yourself away with the last sentence. This is not Biden's war, it is Putin's. Would I like Ukraine to have more weapons with less restrictions? Yes. But the US and most of Europe has kept Ukraine in the fight and with the ability to mount the counteroffensive now underway. Let's see how the battle goes over the next few weeks and months before handing out blame. There is a good chance, handing out blame will be for the Russians to distribute.
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David
CincinnatiJune 10
Of course, there is little doubt that, had Donald Trump occupied the White House at the outset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, then Russia would also then fully occupy Ukraine. Trump is weak.
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PersnicketyRph commented June 10
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PersnicketyRph
Valley Falls, NYJune 10
@William Neil I agree. Biden and Europe have helped but what they don't seem to realize is that if you are going to aid Ukraine then DO IT NOW. This makes the war end sooner. Obviously. This trickle of aid seems insane. Ukraine should have had a mini-air force transferred to it by now. (And Germany has been worse than the US in delays.)
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Bluecheer
Pinehurst, NCJune 10
@William Neil Biden just needs to deliver the ATACMs without fanfare.
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Vcs
FranceJune 10
@William Neil This is going to be a long war. Even if the Uķrainians managed to push Russians out which i doubt will happen anytime soon. So years more of this. I would also agree that the Wests ' 'prudence' isn't helping...we need to provide air power( attack helicopters, aircraft and long range SAMs) as well as long range weapons, allowing them to be used on targets in Russia... This might help accelerate a situation on the ground where both parties might be ready to negociate.... In any case, for those who say that Ukr must show gains now or the Wests aid will slow down, I doubt that very much: its too important for the US & Eur to walk away. So our interest in the shortest war possible: so yes more effort, now!
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Ivan
Memphis, TNJune 10
@William Neil Biden has brilliantly understood that this war cannot be won quickly. If Putin doesn't continue to think that he is just a few good move away from winning this war with conventional weapons, he may turn to tactical nuclear weapons (on civilians). Alternatively, he could decide to go to a full-on war footing with millions of soldiers mobilized and the whole economy turned towards war production. Ukraine would not stand a chance of gaining back more territory in either of those scenarios. Ukraine has been supplied with the weapons needed to gain a slow but steady reversal and de-occupation. It is to Biden's credit that he has understood and gained European support for the only way that all of Ukraine can become free again.
6 Recommend
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Outerboro
NYJune 10
@Ivan This is, I think, pretty astute analysis. It should be noted that whatever funding and allocations Biden has been able to muster in service to providing weapons to Ukraine has to have been with the consent of the rather balky Republican Congressional Caucus. So, even if he wanted to, he could not send huge amounts of weapons with a mere stroke of his pen. Finally, while the Baltic States and Poland have been fully committed to the provision of robust military support to Ukraine since tge beginning of the War, countries in Western Europe, particularly Germany and France, have preferred to have a more "risk averse" approach (they fear "provoking" Putin into rash actions). Biden has done a capable job of keeping this unwieldy coalition from fracturing, and that involving addressing the concerns of major stakeholders. Zelensky understands that the important thing is to get willingness to provide certain categories of weapons. Now, the first Western Tanks have been supplied. Even if there are only a few Dozen now, this is just "The Tip of the Iceberg". Essentially, it's the same for Western Warplanes, when the F-16s are ultimately delivered. It's up to Ukraine to deal with the realities of the constraints that they face, and to make the best of the hand that it has been dealt.
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Outerboro commented 5 hours ago
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Outerboro
NY5h ago
@PersnicketyRph It's quite likely that the NATO countries have a desire to keep Ukraine "On a Tight Leash" -- that is, to retain some control over Ukraine's actions. The National interests of Ukraine and those of the USA are currently in a close convergence. However, those interests are not identical, and it wise to keep some leverage as a way to maintain control over Ukrainian actions and policies. Ukrainian saboteurs probably exploded the North Sea Gas Pipeline. Purely out of environmental considerations, that did not serve European interests. The West would frankly much prefer that Ukraine would make more effort to disassociate itself from Neo-Nazis, or refrain from launching spectacular style Drone strikes against targets in Moscow. All that aside, providing Ukraine with 3 (or 10) times the amount of Tanks and Warplanes (or other expensive weapons systems) would cost much more money. The countries of the West naturally want to economize, and certainly do t want to squander money on providing Ukraine with more than is necessary. As Ukraine is gifted all of these weapons for Free, it is naturally tempting for Ukraine to ask for the Moon and the Stars.
Philadelphia5h ago@David Putin didn’t invade during trumps presidency. Come to think of it, there were no new foreign wars started under trump in spite of proclamations that trump would get the us into world war 3. Too bad we can’t say the same for president Biden who has revved the money machine back up for the MIC. Ever hear the phrase keep your friends close and your enemies closer? Biden is weak.
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Analysis
As readers can see, the pushback by by “Padfoot” of Portland did very well, almost double the number of supporters that my view got. And that’s fine. I’ve kept a pretty focused critique of the war since the beginning, wondering how well Ukraine can do given its shortage of modern Western tanks, mobile artillery, long range rockets and “advanced” aircraft, some of which is always “on the way,” after training is completed.
To me, as I look at those three lines of trenches and what it will take to break through them with enough infantry and armor to exploit a successful breach, I worry a lot, along the lines of the title I’ve given this piece.
For many months, we heard about the struggle for the city of Bakhmut on the Eastern Front, in fighting that strongly resembled, at a smaller scale physically, but perhaps not psychologically, to each side, the battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943, as so powerfully rendered by Vasily Grossman in his book of that title. The cliche being that it, along with its follow up volume, “Life and Fate,” comprise the 20th century’s “War and Peace.” The deep irony here being that in the modern version in Bakhmut, the Russians are no longer the “good guys.” “Stalingrad” the original book barely made it throgh the last of the Stalinist purges, appearing in 1952, entitled “For a Just Cause,” yet still coming under some fierce attacks in 1953-54. The English version, sadly, did not appear until 2019. Putin should be happy about that, because Grossman evolved from a war correspondent with the “Red Star” (Soviet version of Stars and Stripes) in the field with the troops, Ernie Pyle like, and slowly finishing his portrait of life under political commisars with Volume II: “Life and Fate.” For the left in the West, I can’t think of a better long summer’s read than these books, which will help explain why so many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, formerly under Russian rule until 1991, want no part of Putin’s dream for a revitalized Russian “empire” and want to get into NATO ASAP, thus helping to fan the age old Russian paranoia of the West. Readers who want the case against the US and NATO for allowing this to happen, 1991-2008 and beyond, can take a look as this interview with Professor John Mearsheimer of the U. of Chicago, famous by now for his criticism of our post Cold War strategy: 42 minutes but well worth it.
What caught my attention on the denouement commentary on the Russian capture of Bakhmut on c. May 20, 2023, was a New York Times story which ran on May 23, “The Battle for Bakmut, in Photos, by Marc Santora. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/23/world/europe/bakhmut-photos-ukraine.html
Here’s a clue to the whole structural imbalance in this war, about “mass and means”:
“At one point, Ukraine officials estimated that Russian forces were firing 50,000 artillery rounds every day, noting that their own troops could only hit back with around 5,000-6,000 rounds.”
And that’s one example of why I keep harping on the shortage of Western mobile artillery pieces, howitzers, that is, where Ukraine’s received in the low hundreds and probably a thousand are needed; and less than 150 modern tanks in three varities from three different nations and the logistical problems that clumsy reality sets in motion. Ditto for the longer range ATACMS missles which have been withheld and the long delayed F-16 aircraft release. Can Ukraine make it through those three deep defensive lines, miles deep, without these components? Can morale alone make up for the “handicap” the West has imposed?
You don’t have to teach tactics and strategies at West Point to imagine what General Robert E. Lee, U.S. Grant, Jeb Stuart and Stonewall Jackson would have thought about so tying up the tactical imagination with fears of what Putin might do. Or George Patton to take the analogy into WWII. It’s a strong clue as to why impatient Ukraine began striking Russian targets inside Russian territory, even to the rooftops of the Kremlin itself. That’s all about the psychology of war, keeping the other side uncertain, and fighting the battle for civilian comfort/discomfort, which has fallen so heavily upon the Urkrainian people, on the discomfort side, and has only gotten worse as the war has dragged on.
The Ukranians, in these actions deep inside Russian territory, symbolically to the heart of the Russian nation via Moscow, aren’t doing anything different than the US did in WWII with the Doolittle Raid of April, 1942 which bombed the Japanese homeland from carrier launched aircraft at a time when the whole flow of the war in the Pacific had been “one way” for the Rising Sun, and the US had been deeply humiliated by the attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.
The same for the British in North Africa fighting the Italians and then Rommel’s Africa Corp. Starting in Dec. 1940 and continuing through April 1943 they formed the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) of some 350 commandos, mainly New Zealanders, invented new types of vehicles to carry them to raid far behind Axis lines, attacking airfields and supply depots, and also doing reconnaisance on all the major roads.
Now defenders of President Biden, and Germany’s and France’s caution will doubtless reply that neither Germany or Japan had a nuclear capability in WWII. True, but how employable is that weapon for Putin and Russia? If he uses a tactical nuke either to stop a breakthrough or attack Kyiv, then he must know that NATO will enter, not with return tactical nukes, but the air power they have been building up along Ukraine’s Western borders, in NATO countries for over a year. And Russia forever after will be a pariah state, maybe even after Putin is overthrown. I would hope the same response would be brought upon Putin’s head if he sabotages the huge nuclear power station that Russian forces control, that they have been dangling over Ukraine’s head almost from the start of the war: at Zaporizhzhya.
For those who worry about the nuclear possibility, you may want to consider the view of Professor Yuri Felshtinsky, who has journeyed from Israel, to Vienna and ended up at Rutgers. 37 minutes for “Blowing Up Ukraine,” an Putin-KGB spirited gambit, he alleges, to send some tactical nukes to Belarus, train the crews, and pin the blame on rogues from there if and when they are used. The West’s response should be the same as I outlined above.
Who Done It - and Why?
And now for the even tougher events, launching into “deconstruction” mode to explain, starting with the most recent “case,” the destruction/collapse of the dam across the Dnipro River, the Kakhovka Dam, which unfolded between June 2-7, 2023.
I rely on the conventional accounts of the NY Times, the YouTube pieces of the Times of London, Reuters and several other sources somewhat out of the main lines of disputing parties.
I’ll start with Anders Puck Nielsen, an analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College, whom I seek out for defense college type detachment. 13 minutes:
I like the way he proceeds: who controls that dam, who stood to gain from its destruction and the flooding it let loose, and if Russia was in charge (and he leans that way) their fears of the coming offensive, and troops crossing the Dnipro or even rushing across the roadway atop the damn, may have led to a premature and ill-timed major incident. I wondered myself if the Ukrainians might have launched a frogman type attack, but the level of explosives most seem to think was needed rule that out.
And then there is Ryan McBeth’s take. He’s got US military experience in anti-armor ordinance and military contractor work after that, and while I can’t vouch for his style, he’s always worth an unconventional look when an incident like this happens. He leans towards a slowly building dam collapse from negligence or ignorance, but the fact that water was building up higher than normal without relief a month before the event, and that the road was collapsing as early as June 2nd push me in the direction that Russia had the motive and the means. Flooding civilian land to head off hostile military maneuver room should be in all American’s memory via D-Day, June 6, 1944, when our paratroopers from the 101st and 82nd Airborne divisionsdropped at night into Normandy, many to drown in areas the Germans had deliberately flooded to contain such operations.
Editor’s Note, June 17, 2023: In a New York Times Story entitled “An Inside Job” a June 16th article by multiple authors concludes the dam was likely destroyed by large explosive charges placed deep in the interior of the dam. I lean towards that conclusion. Why was it blown? To slow the offensive and inflict as much civilian damage on Ukraine as possible. Another saga in a very dirty Russian war.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-collapse.html Very good maps and pics.
Well, I hope that this little “essay” begins to answer some of the questions about the war, where it is going, and perhaps “ought” to go. At least for now.
Best to Ukraine, its military and civilians and to chef Jose Andres “ World Central Kitchen” which moved in to aid the flood victims shortly after the dam was destroyed. He must have heard that an “army travels on its stomach” - and civilians too.
William Neil
Frostburg, MD
I'll use the comment mechanism to link to this rather long but very informed discussion at the London Times with a former British Air Marshall and very experienced jet pilot on a number of aircraft, but especially the F-16's we are supposed to be sending them. The piece is full of British understatement and politeness, but I couldn't help but draw the conclusion the Air Marshall laments the late delivery, the long training period (six months at least and maybe more to handle the updates for radar and weaponry...another layer beyond just flying the aircraft skills. It sounds like, with resignation the conclusion is they'll be there in time to protect Ukraine in the future after the ground forces push the Russian back. My round about way of saying I'm not sure Ukraine can win without the type of air power, in layers that should go with the ground offensive. This compliments where I was and was going on June 11th....https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JuudTiYdsEk
Editor's Update Sat. June 24...12:05 PM. From the London Times podcast at You tube relying on reporter Askold Krushelnycky in the Eastern Ukraine. Essentially that there has been no Putin-leaning military opposition blocking Wagner-Prigozhin forces from moving some 400 miles up M-4 highway towards Moscow. No air forces able to strike? A few indications there were, but shot down or beaten off. Has Prigozhin been able to behind the scenes, win complicity to "stay in the barracks" from key Russian military leaders who would be the likely source of opposition to Putin's war conduct? The next 48-72 hours should make that clearer. As to the US Senate Resolution I referred to in yesterday's (6/23) update to this main posting, my ask to broaden and strengthen it I think is more needed than ever to foreclose desperate moves on the battlefield more likely in my take to be in the form of blowing dams, leaking radiation or chemicals than any traditional military thrust...the amended resolution can make it clear that there will be no attempts to capture Russian territory on the russian side of the 1991 boundaries. Defensive airstrikes to head off Russian offensives moves excepted. One doesn't capture territory with air power alone. So that should be clear.